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Public Comments Run Amok: Reforming the Notice 
and Comment Process to Help Reduce the Negative 
Effects of Mass and Fake Comments 
GWENDOLYN MCKEE SAVITZ† 
ABSTRACT 
The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to give the
public an opportunity to submit comments in response to proposed 
regulations. When the proposed regulations address particularly hot-
button issues, agencies can be flooded with millions of comments from
the public in response. This most memorably occurred twice when John
Oliver exhorted viewers of his show to write in to protect net neutrality.
The vast majority of the millions of comments submitted in both
processes were duplicative, providing no benefit for the agency; sent in
under the name of a person who did not submit them; or both. If the vast
majority of the comments coming in are essentially useless, it is time to
rethink the process.
This Article argues that two simple fixes could help solve many of
the problems caused by these duplicative and/or falsely attributed
comments: (1) The submission process should be restructured so that
individuals sign on to the comments of other individuals rather than
submitting their own unique comment, and (2) Commentors should be
allowed the option of verifying their identity when submitting a 
comment. These would help reduce the harm caused by both types of
these comments and would be expected to be embraced by all affected
interests: the agencies, the public, and the third-party organizations
driving the proliferation of mass comments.
† J.D. American University, LL.M. Yale. Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa 
College of Law.
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7612021] PUBLIC COMMENTS RUN AMOK
INTRODUCTION 
The adage to “vote early and vote often” is understood as completely
antithetical to the American concept of democracy.1 But it is alive and
well in comments to proposed administrative regulations, where
individuals sometimes submit dozens or even hundreds of identical 
comments to an agency, presumably under the mistaken belief that it is
the number of “votes” that will change the agency’s final rule. These 
submissions need not even be in the name of the person actually
submitting them, since there is no verification of the identity of
commentors. These related issues, mass comments and fake comments,
have become a plague on the administrative state.
The prevalence of these issues demonstrates general public
confusion about the role of comments in the administrative process.
Agencies are only required to consider “substantive” comments— 
comments that bring to light issues the agency has not considered or not 
fully understood. Thus, the internet-driven phenomenon of mass
participation is not only problematic for the rule-making agencies, which
have to process an avalanche of nearly identical submitted comments, but
for the public, which may believe that democracy is undermined when
“voters” have spoken overwhelmingly in favor of the position that is
ultimately rejected by the agency. The public can become even more
concerned when fake comments are discovered so it appears that
someone was stuffing the ballot box.
This Article argues that relatively simple alterations to the comment
system would ameliorate these problems. Specifically, that the comment
submissions process be revised so that individuals can sign on to a
comment previously submitted by another individual (or interest group),
and so that individuals can choose to verify their identity. These changes
would provide the following benefits: 1. Decrease the review burden on
agencies by making additions to mass comments coherent on their own
and reducing the incentive for fake comments altogether. 2. Facilitate a 
shift in public understanding of the rule-making process. 3. Make it easier
for stakeholders to see the variety of comments submitted to the agency.
4. Improve public trust in the rulemaking process. 5. Protect the
individuals currently targeted in fake comments submitted to the
agencies.
1. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER
THE LAW 19 (2004) (“[F]or years the mantra of Chicago politics.”)
   
           
       
          
          
           
        
  
         
        
         
        
          
          
         
       
       
 
          
        
 
         
            
               
 
            
             
             
           
          
         
               
             
       
      
           
            
 
    
762 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
This Article begins in Part I by briefly describing the history of the
notice and comment process, including the ever-present but increasing
role of mass comments, and the new plague of fake comments. In Part II 
it then describes in detail how these mass and fake comments affect each
of the three interests: the agencies, the public, and the third-party interest
groups. Finally, in Part III, it describes the related solutions, first for
addressing mass comments and then for addressing fake comments,
before briefly concluding.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW AND HISTORY OF NOTICE AND COMMENT 
RULEMAKING 
Since 1946, when the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2 was
passed, two options have been available for agency rulemaking. The first
option is formal rulemaking.3 Formal rulemaking is a trial-like process
where interested parties are allowed to cross-examine the witnesses for
all other interested parties at live hearings. Functionally, it results in a 
trial-like process where there are not simply a plaintiff and a defendant, 
but a plethora of parties, all trying to make their own points and cross-
examining the witnesses of all the other parties. In retrospect, it should
be of little surprise that formal rulemaking has proven virtually 
unworkable.4 
The second option is informal rulemaking,5 more often called notice
and comment rulemaking. Informal rulemaking is informal in the same 
2. Codified starting at 5 U.S.C. § 551.
3. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557. This process is required in all instances “[w]hen rules are
required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 553.
4. One particularly notorious example of this practice was a years-long formal 
rulemaking process conducted by the FDA intended primarily to raise the required peanut
content of peanut butter less than three percentage points. See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers Inc.
v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1167 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980) (quoting
a letter from then Chairman Robert Anthony to Congressman Staggers describing the lengthy
rulemaking session and stating “a hearing transcript of over 7,700 pages has been devoted 
exclusively to the question whether peanut butter should consist of 87½ percent or 90 percent
peanuts”); see also Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on A Record by the Food and Drug
Administration, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1142–45 (1972) (describing the proceeding in slightly 
greater depth). Food identity standards can now effectively be locked in place by requiring 
that they be changed only through formal rulemaking. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (requiring,
among other things, that the standards of identity for all dairy products can be changed only
through formal rulemaking).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
   
           
            
 
         
          
     
         
      
         
      
           
          
         
 
       
           
      
 
           
             
           
           
         
   
                 
               
                  
               
          
        
            
    
                 
          
 
          
          
          
               
           
         
      
           
         
7632021] PUBLIC COMMENTS RUN AMOK
way that black tie is informal. It’s not, unless one compares it to white
tie.6 White tie here is equivalent to formal rulemaking both in its
increased level of formality and its rarity in modern society.
Notice and comment rulemaking relies on the same bedrock
principles of American law that formal rulemaking does: notice7 and the 
opportunity to intervene when interests are at stake.8 
In notice and comment rulemaking, this opportunity to intervene
occurs through the comment system. When an agency initiates a
rulemaking by publishing the proposed rule in the Federal Register, the
public is given an opportunity to submit comments on the proposed rule.
The agency must then review all substantive comments and respond to
them when publishing the final rule.9 The basic requirements of this
process have not changed over time, but the means of accomplishing 
them have.
In the pre-internet era, notice was provided through the Federal 
Register. The Federal Register predates the passage of the APA10 and
serves as official notice for both executive and administrative action.11 
6. NICHOLAS STOREY, HISTORY OF MEN’S FASHION: WHAT THE WELL-DRESSED MAN IS
WEARING 85 (2008) (describing the difference between white tie and black tie); cf. JESSICA
FELLOWES, THE WORLD OF DOWNTON ABBEY 146, 149 (2011) (stating that the upper class
only began to wear black tie in place of white tie to dinner around the end of the First World 
War, and even then black tie was considered “very (to some uncomfortably) informal” 
(quoting Julian Fellowes)).
7. Notice is a fundamental component of the American legal system. It is the reason for
the prohibition against retroactive laws. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting all “ex post
facto Law[s]”). It is also the reason why a defendant in a lawsuit must be served notice of the
lawsuit. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 545 (2010) (analyzing whether
a corporate entity related to the initial defendant should be held to have sufficient constructive
notice of a lawsuit to get around the delay in formally serving the complaint).
8. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (governing when an individual may intervene as a third party 
in a case as of right).
9. Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“An
agency must also demonstrate the rationality of its decision-making process by responding to
those comments that are relevant and significant.”).
10. Amy Bunk, Federal Register 101, 67 PROCEEDINGS (SPRING) 55, 55 (2010).
11. 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (stating that publication in the Federal Register creates a rebuttable
presumption that the statutory requirements of notice have been fulfilled); Fed. Crop Ins. v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (holding that farmers who were incorrectly told by an
employee of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation that they could reseed their wheat and
still be eligible for crop insurance were in fact not eligible for crop insurance since a regulation
prohibiting eligibility for reseeding had been published in the Federal Register). This is
despite the generally understood fact that most people are likely not even aware of its
existence. See JAMES T. O’REILLY, REGULATORY MANUAL SERIES: ADMINISTRATIVE
   
             
         
         
 
        
        
         
             
           
        
            
          
          
           
        
         
 
       
 
                
               
              
             
              
 
              
          
             
    
                 
                 
                
           
        
              
    
 
                  
        
          
    
 
     
      
764 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
Physical copies of the Federal Register were (and still are) available in a
limited number of locations throughout the country for viewing by
interested parties.12 These locations included law libraries and federal
depository libraries.13 
In practice, monitoring of the Federal Register was primarily done
by those parties with a broad interest in particular areas of law. An 
environmental law firm, for instance, would monitor the Federal Register
to stay apprised of all relevant action by the EPA. The firm, in turn, would
inform its clients of any developments. Since one needed to be physically
present to read the paper copy of the Federal Register, monitoring it
required both time and physical access.14 Comments were sent by mail to
the appropriate agency, which processed them and retained them in a
single physical location for examination by other interested parties.15 
The Federal Register was initially moved online in 1994,16 and found
its current online location at federalregister.gov in 2003.17 While this
eliminated the need to travel to a discrete physical location to view
RULEMAKING 1983 p.354 n.15 (“In actual experience, the Federal Register is not widely
read.”).
12. In many instances it was also possible to get copies of complete documents from the
Federal Register (for a fee) from the government through the mail, although one would need
to know about the proposed rule and the appropriate fee in order to do so. Medicare Program; 
Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1995 Rates,
59 Fed. Reg. 45330 (Sept. 1, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, 466, 482, 485,
489).
13. Id. (stating that interested parties could order a copy of the relevant pages for six
dollars or by photocopying “the Federal Register document at most libraries designated as
Federal Depository Libraries and at many other public and academic libraries throughout the
country that receive the Federal Register”).
14. This was difficult to do for many people, even ones who were actively trying to
monitor it. C.f. Former Emps. of Bass Enter.s Prod. Co. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 625,
628 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1988) (“Plaintiffs state that they live in an area of west Texas where there
are two law libraries, one county library, and one junior college with a library, but that none 
of the four libraries subscribe to the Federal Register.”).
15. MICHAEL HERZ, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., USING SOCIAL MEDIA IN RULEMAKING:
POSSIBILITIES AND BARRIERS 9 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Herz%20Social%20Media%20Final%20Report.pdf.
16. On June 8, 1994, issues of the Federal Register dating back to January 3, 1994, were
placed online “on a newly inaugurated GPO Access service.” A Brief History Commemorating
the 70th Anniversary of the Publication of the First Issue of the Federal Register, OFF. FED.
REG. 15 (March 14, 2006) http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/the-federal-register/
history.pdf.
17. The eRulemaking Initiative, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://test.regulations.gov/about
Program (last visited June 19, 2019).
   
        
 
          
          
          
     
           
       
  
            
            
           
           
            
          
        
      
           
          
      
 
              
           
           
  
            
            
            
          
               
  
         
           
   
               
        
              
  
               
      
7652021] PUBLIC COMMENTS RUN AMOK
agency publications, it did not reduce the time or sophistication required
to understand the documents.
Nevertheless, the move online was greeted with great excitement in
the early days of the internet revolution. As commenting also came online
there was speculation that the unique nature of the internet would allow
collaborative commenting, where individuals with differing viewpoints
on a rule would learn from each other in civilized discussions that would
provide the agency with nuanced comments and greater buy-in from the
public. 18 
That did not happen.19 The shift online changed the physical way in
which people were commenting on proposed rules, but not the nature of
the comments being provided or the singularly reactive nature of the
majority of the comments (as opposed to the reasoned arguments hoped
for). The internet also did not create the mass comment phenomenon, but
the ease of internet commenting has enabled citizen participation at an
unprecedented scale.20 These mass comments, and their effects on
different constituencies, are discussed in the next section.
A. The Rise of Mass Comments 
Mass comment campaigns are not a new phenomenon. Prior to the
internet they were generally done with form letters or postcards.21 While
the internet did not create these comments, however, it did accelerate
18. See Stephen Zavestoski et al., Democracy and the Environment on the Internet:
Electronic Citizen Participation in Regulatory Rulemaking, 31 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES
383, 392 (2006) (referencing others arguing that the internet would enable a new form of
dialogue).
19. Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet Still Might (but Probably Won’t) Change
Everything, 1 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 111, 115 (2005) [hereinafter The Internet
Still Might] (“Six years later, it remains uncertain whether the technology has delivered many
benefits beyond the periodic spike in public participation and education fostered by organized
interest groups that have traded in their postcards for the lure of the mass e-mail and web site-
driven awareness campaigns.”).
20. Transcript of Symposium, MASS AND FAKE COMMENTS IN AGENCY RULEMAKING,
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. & ADMIN. L. REV. 93 (2018), https://www.acus.gov/transcript/
mass-and-fake-comments-agency-rulemaking-transcript [hereinafter Transcript] (describing
how the internet changed the raw number of comments, but not the nature of mass comments.
“That’s always been the case. It was the case in the early years of rulemaking. It was the case 
in the old paper-based days of rulemaking. I think what we are seeing is the increase in the
size of the bounce.”).
21. Zavestoski et al., supra note 18, at 387 (2006) (discussing a rulemaking that received
over one million “postcards and other form letters”).
   
          
        
        
     
              
            
        
   
            
     
       
             
        
           
             
       
       
       
         
       
        
      
            
      
       
        
           
           
   
 
                  
     
           
  
       
         
     
           
   
766 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
their rise in a couple different ways. Allowing comments to be submitted
online—first through email and then through a dedicated federal website, 
regulations.gov—reduced the cost of submitting a comment from the
price of a stamp down to zero. Certainly many individuals commenting 
would have been equally willing to comment for the cost of a stamp, but
there are also likely many more who would not comment as frequently if 
doing so required the price of a stamp or the effort to add the stamp and 
mail a letter.22 
But the true growth in comments is likely driven by the outside
organizations that would have traditionally been responsible for
organizing these postcard or form letter campaigns. These organizations
may have had an incentive to drive the mass comments merely in a
(misguided) belief that doing so would significantly change the agency
outcome. However, another factor has played a large role in this trend. 
The ability of third parties to submit comments directly to the docket of
a proposed rule23 has enabled them to turn the comment process into an 
opportunity to recruit interested members of the public, solicit monetary
donations, and show their strength, as discussed further in Section II.C.2.
B. The Rise of Fake Comments 
Fake comments can be considered any comment where the
individual does not specifically elect to remain anonymous and instead
uses another’s name. In contrast to mass comments, fake comments have
only become a major concern recently. Presumably comments with a
fraudulent identity were being submitted to some extent all along, but the
rise in internet-submitted mass comments seems to have dramatically
accelerated the trend. Most people learned about the problem with fake 
comments for the first time after the second net neutrality rulemaking,
when millions of fake comments were found to have been submitted,24 
but they did not start there, and there are different reasons a comment can
be considered fake.
22. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the solution is to charge the cost of a
stamp. See infra note 102.
23. Public notice and comment rulemaking, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/USA-Public-Notice-and-Comment.pdf (last
visited April 17, 2021) (“The eRulemaking program has also developed a commenting 
Application Programming Interface (API) that allows partners to submit comments to 
agencies through their own applications and websites.”).
24. Nicholas Confessore, New York Attorney General Expands Inquiry Into Net
Neutrality Comments, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2018, at B3.
   
          
       
        
      
       
         
        
        
          
          
           
        
              
 
       
           
             
      
             
  
 
          
     
               
                
               
          
            
  
            
          
    
              
             
            
          
             
           
     
            
        
      
      
7672021] PUBLIC COMMENTS RUN AMOK
Sometimes the name chosen is clearly fake. Mickey Mouse, for
instance, commented on multiple proposed rules in 2016, including
Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft,25 
Manufactured Home Procedural and Enforcement Regulations; Revision
of Exemption for Recreational Vehicles,26 and Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards; Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations: Parts and
Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Speed Limiting Devices.27 
With a well-known fake name, such a comment can more accurately be
interpreted as anonymous. And the comments submitted to each of those
rules (available in full in the footnotes) do appear to potentially reflect
the heartfelt beliefs of the submitters. These are the easiest to discover,
but they are also the least likely to be problematic, since no individual
will be hurt by the submission and there are no claimed expertise or group
membership.28 
More problematic are comments submitted in bulk using 
information obtained on the dark web.29 These can provide the agency
with a distorted view of the true public opinion on an issue, and the
individuals involved could face potential embarrassment and frustration
if they were to learn their stolen information was used to submit the
comment.
25. Mickey Mouse, Comment Post on Registration and Marking Requirements for Small
Unmanned Aircraft (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FAA-2015-
7396-5294 (“Anyone with a brain knowns you’re looking to make examples of people to flex
your muscle, it’s just a matter of time. I called the Heliport within 4.4 miles of my house and
they had NO CLUE WHAT THE HELL I WAS TAlKING ABOUT. I for one am not letting
you screw my life up because of a toy drone. Have fun screwing over people and check out
eBay, I will give the dame thing away before I let you fine me or put me in jail.” (errors and
emphasis in original)).
26. Mickey Mouse, Comment Post on Manufactured Home Procedural and Enforcement
Regulations; Revision of Exemption for Recreational Vehicles (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0013-4753 (“It is amazing to me that
the government has to go after those who need this and are not hurting any one. Just because
the government can’t mange their funds does not give them the right to attach those who don’t
need this regulation. Maybe the politicians should take a look at their pocket and leave those
who need this ALONE !!” (errors and emphasis in original)).
27. Mickey Mouse, Comment Post on Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations: Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Speed
Limiting Devices (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FMCSA-
2014-0083-3831 (“This the dumbest rule ever it unsafe u r probably to dumb to realize it but
it will drive up freight costs but what do u care” (errors in original)).
28. See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
   
         
       
       
   
           
      
          
       
        
           
        
        
          
          
        
          
   
           
             
            
           
   
          
       
           
   
         
         
        
 
            
            
    
 
          
768 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
From an agency perspective, identical comments submitted under a
variety of names are unlikely to significantly alter the outcome, as
discussed in Section II.A.1, nor will they consume a significant amount
of agency time.
However, it is also possible for companies to use machine learning
and natural language processing to create individual unique comments,
each of which can then be submitted under a different false name.30 These
comments can be sophisticated enough, at least in terms of language, that 
they cannot immediately be identified as machine created.31 While
substantively these are also unlikely to influence the final outcome, they
can potentially require significantly more agency resources for what is
not a meaningful contribution to the agency’s understanding of the issue.
Finally, the most problematic fake comments are those where a
specific individual has been targeted, either to take advantage of some
aspect of their identity (like pretending to be a doctor) or to personally 
hurt them by presenting the opposite of their true view because they have
been involved in causes related to the rulemaking.
Presenting information to the agency that is falsely claimed to be
from a given source could impact the final rule, as discussed in Section
II.A.2, but in most instances the impact of this type of comment will be
felt most acutely by those who have been impersonated, as discussed
further in Section II.B.2.
II. MASS AND FAKE COMMENTS CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR EVERYONE 
This part analyzes the effects of both mass and fake comments on
the three interest groups primarily affected by them: the agencies, 
members of the public, and the third-party interest groups that drive the
mass comment campaigns.
A. How Agencies are Affected by Mass and Fake Comments 
These problematic comments affect agencies in multiple ways. At
an initial level, they demonstrate a lack of understanding that the general
public has for the way the agency operates, which can impact the
30. See Jeremy Singer-Vine & Kevin Collier, Political Operatives are Faking Voter
Outrage with Millions of Made-Up Comments to Benefit the Rich and Powerful, BUZZFEED
(Oct. 3, 2019, 9:32 AM) https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jsvine/net-neutrality-fcc-
fake-comments-impersonation.
31. See infra note 54 for examples of a simplified form.
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7692021] PUBLIC COMMENTS RUN AMOK
reception of the resulting rule, but the problems go deeper than that.
The APA requires agencies to consider substantive comments.32 
Mass comments are generally not substantive because the arguments in
mass comments are primarily policy-based, the least useful type of
comment from the agency perspective.33 As mass comments are not
substantive, they are also often not responded to in the preamble to final
rules or even significantly considered when determining the final rule.34 
They make little difference to the final outcome because the primary
purpose of commenting is to bring to the agency’s attention issues it has
not considered or not fully understood.35 The most useful comments for
the agency, which do things like compare the proposed regulatory text
with the text of the authorizing statute,36 require legal sophistication that
32. Am. Great Lakes Ports Ass’n v. Zukunft, 296 F. Supp. 3d 27, 53 (D.D.C. 2017)
(explaining how the Coast Guard is required under the APA to “respond in a reasoned manner 
to significant comments received.” But that this “has never been interpreted to require the 
agency to respond to every comment, or to analyze every issue or alternative raised by the 
comments, no matter how insubstantial.” This is because “comments must be significant
enough to step over a threshold requirement of materiality before any lack of agency response 
or consideration becomes of concern.” (first quoting U.S. Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC, 740 
F.2d 1177, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1984); then quoting Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 408 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); and then quoting Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C.
Cir. 1973))).
33. The Internet Still Might, supra note 19, at 133 (“Agency personnel have stated 
consistently that whether it is 50 or 500,000 identical or similar comments, the value added
to the rulemaking process is considerably less than one careful, specific, substantive
comment.”).
34. Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1365 n.125 (2011) (noting that in the final version of the “Clean Air
Mercury Rule” the EPA only addressed what it called “[s]ome of the more significant
comments” in the preamble to the rule).
35. Public notice and comment rulemaking, supra note 23 (“The purposes of allowing 
public comment are (1) to provide the agency with information that will increase the agency’s
knowledge of the subject matter of the proposed rule and (2) to permit the public to challenge
the factual assumptions, analyses and tentative conclusions underlying the proposed rule and
to show the agency the respects in which it might be in error.”).
36. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
411, 478 (2005) (finding that in the three rulemakings studied, “three sophistication variables
seem to have the strongest effect: (a) whether the comment distinguished the statutory 
requirement from the content of the regulation, (b) whether the comment suggested an explicit
change in the proposed regulatory rule, and (b) whether the comment provided a page or more 
of legal or empirical background analysis. Distinguishing between the statutory requirement 
and what the regulation provides is associated with a 46-fold increase in the odds that a
comment will contain an accepted suggestion.”).
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would not be expected from the average American.37 With this
understanding of the comment process, identical mass comments are
pointless since they are by definition providing only the same
information.
Mass comments are nevertheless a major proportion of the
comments submitted and even dockets receiving relatively few total
comments can still receive identical submissions.38 The primary issue for
the agency, then, is simply managing these comments. When comments 
were physically mailed in, every comment had to be physically dealt
with. There was some uncertainty initially when comments began to
arrive electronically whether the agency was similarly required to
physically handle each individual submission, so early comments that had
been emailed in were often printed and sorted exactly as the paper
submissions had been.39 
But volume alone is not necessarily a significant problem from the
agency’s perspective. Comments no longer need to be printed in physical
form and computers can easily identify identical comments and flag them
as such, ensuring that significant agency time is not wasted reviewing
identical comments.40 
Perhaps in response to this, many organizations recommend that
commentors personalize their submissions, claiming that it will make the 
37. Cynthia R. Farina et. al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 438 [hereinafter 
Rulemaking 2.0] (noting that the reading level of the average American is only at the eighth-
grade level, while the two proposed regulations they examined, despite being “(in [their]
judgment) clearly organized, well-written and carefully explained” nevertheless received
reading scores equivalent to a college or even graduate school education).
38. For instance, the docket related to Takes of Marine Mammals Incidental to Specified
Activities; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Oil and Gas Activities in Cook Inlet,
Alaska, received twenty comments, two of which were identical. Paola Castano & Elizabeth
Nugent, Comment Posts on Proposed Rule to Takes of Marine Mammals Incidental to
Specified Activities; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Oil and Gas Activities in Cook
Inlet, Alaska (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document/NOAA-NMFS-2019-
0026-0001/comment.
39. Stuart W. Shulman, The Case Against Mass E-mails: Perverse Incentives and Low
Quality Public Participation in U.S. Federal Rulemaking, 1 POL’Y & INTERNET 23, 46 (2009)
[hereinafter The Case Against Mass E-mails] (“Indeed all of the comments, dup[licates] and
non-dup[licates] alike, were printed on paper (the legal record at EPA) and reportedly sorted 
by the shape of the words on the page by a team of 15 staffers making piles.”).
40. Transcript, supra note 20, at 38–39 (stating that the primary purpose of the de-
duplication tool is to enable faster processing of comments); see also The Case Against Mass
E-mails, supra note 39, at 38.
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comment more meaningful.41 This push then results in many mass
comments that contain some unique portions in addition to the mass text.
But even though the agency can identify highly similar comments, using
the same de-duplication tool used to identify identical comments,42 
similar comments can still require additional review by a human.
This requirement that the comment be read by someone, however,
does not automatically mean the comment is being read by employees of
the agency responsible for the relevant rule. The volume of comments
submitted has in some cases required agencies to hire contractors 
specifically to deal with the comments.43 These contractors then submit
summaries to the agency and the agency directly deals only with the
summaries.44 
Mass comments from an agency’s perspective are thus primarily a 
nuisance that must be dealt with. A nuisance no doubt caused, at least in 
part, by a persistent belief among members of the public that comments
submitted are essentially votes for a particular policy that will in some
way bind the agency to go along with the publicly expressed preference
or at least that an avalanche of comments in favor of one outcome on a
particular issue will force the agency to follow the public will.45 
But while many outside observers are concerned by the increasing 
numbers of proposed regulations generating mass comments,46 there is
41. E.g., Don’t Let President Trump’s EPA Put Drinking Water At Risk, SIERRA CLUB
https://addup.sierraclub.org/campaigns/dont-let-president-trumps-epa-put-drinking-water-at-
risk (proceeding the comment submission form with the note “Personal messages make a big
impact on decision makers. Please add a note about why this issue matters to you!”).
42. Transcript, supra note 20, at 82 (explaining how the tool can be set to flag comments
with specific levels of similarity, such as 70% similar).
43. Bridget C.E. Dooling, Legal Issues in E-Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 893, 901 
(2011).
44. Michael A. Livermore et al., Computationally Assisted Regulatory Participation, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977, 1016 (2018) (noting that the process is also “potentially error prone
because it would be inordinately expensive to hire seasoned experts to carry out this task”).
45. See Rulemaking 2.0, supra note 37, at 431–32 (2011) (describing the two cultural
patterns that could lead the public to feel the total number of comments submitted rather than 
the substance of the comments was important. “The first is the popular equation in the United
States of democratic voice with casting a vote . . . . The second pattern is from online culture: 
Voting is how the Web works. Ranking or rating—by assigning stars, sliding a bar, or simply 
clicking ‘Like’ or ‘Recommend’—is a staple of Web 2.0 interactivity.”).
46. This issue is a significant enough concern to have become one of the two issues
discussed at a recent symposium. See generally Transcript, supra note 20. See also The Case
Against Mass E-mails, supra note 39, at 35 (deeming people who submit more than one
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also broad support for allowing comments made by the general public.47 
Public comments are viewed as one means through which agencies are
held accountable to the public.48 As agencies are only politically
accountable indirectly, through the chain of command to the executive49 
or through the oversight and purse string power of Congress,50 this is one
way that the public can make its views known to the agency.
In this way of thinking, agencies, even if they do not act on the mass
comments, are made aware of the sensitivity of the issue and the potential
political repercussions.51 The mere fact that an issue has generated mass
comments can alert the agency to potential future problems and 
potentially prompt major changes to the final rule, as occurred with the
organic regulations (one of the rare times comments seem to have had a
significant effect on the final rule).52 
The public confusion over the true role of comments, however, can 
impact how the agency is viewed by the public. High profile rulemakings
in which many, if not most, of the comments submitted go against the
direction chosen by the agency can make the public feel that they are at
comment “Plebers” as they were “contributing to the plebiscitary notion of electronic 
rulemaking by sending two or more e-mails”).
47. See Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE
L.J. 359, 361–62 (1972) (describing some of the benefits of public participation in the
administrative process.) But see Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 174–75 
(1997) (describing the interest in public participation in administrative law as “somewhat of 
a fetish”).
48. Rossi, supra note 47, at 182 (“[I]mmediate participation in the decisionmaking
process before an agency takes action also serves as a type of informal oversight, ensuring 
that the agency is accountable to the public at large for its decisions.”).
49. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in A Deliberative Model of the
Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1411–16 (2013) (describing the
presidential control model for administrative action).
50. Id. at 1409–11.
51. Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public
Participation That Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123, 138 (2012) (claiming that
even the mere mention of mass comments should be enough to put high level presidential
appointees “on notice that the rulemaking has generated the level of advocacy/interest group 
support or opposition likely to draw the attention of White House staff, members of Congress,
and the media”).
52. Zavestoski et al., supra note 18, at 385–86 (2006) (describing how the USDA
reversed the proposed definition of organic food to one that did not allow “genetically
modified organisms . . . , irradiated food, and food grown using biosolids” in response to
public comments that were vehemently against such inclusions despite having no scientific
evidence of harm from any of the practices).
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the mercy of a dictatorship rather than participants in a marvelous
democratic process. The problem is even worse when the comments have
not been submitted by real people.
To a large extent, agencies deal with fake comments the same way
as mass comments, particularly when the comments are indeed identical,
and are merely submitted in the names of individuals who did not in fact
submit them. Since the total number of comments submitted in a given
direction do not affect the final agency result in any meaningful way,53 
the validity of the given identity of a single submitter will have even less
effect on the final agency result.
The issue becomes more concerning for what might be termed deep
fake comments, comments that are not merely submitted in the names of
individuals who did not submit them but are generated through
background processing to make it look like they are in fact original
comments.54 
Because agencies must respond to any significant comments, these
53. U.S. Cellular Corp. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Commission
has no obligation to take the approach advocated by the largest number of commenters;
indeed, the Commission may adopt a course endorsed by no commenter. The Commission’s
only responsibilities are to respond to comments, and to choose a reasonable approach backed 
up by record evidence.” (citations omitted)).
54. An early type of natural language generator was used on some of the net neutrality
comments. Buzzfeed reverse engineered the generator, which worked by creating a basic
comment with more than 30 open fields, each of which could be filled by a randomly selected
option from a number of pre-set phrases or words. Two examples of comments generated
from the BuzzFeed simulator are (exactly as provided):
FCC commissioners, I’m very worried about Internet regulation and net neutrality.
I want to demand the commissioners to reverse Obama’s decision to take over the
Internet. People like me, rather than unelected bureaucrats, should be able to enjoy 
the serves they want. Obama’s decision to take over the Internet is a distortion of
net neutrality. It ended a market-based approach that functioned remarkably weak 
for many years with both parties’ backing.
and
Dear Mr. Pai, I’m contacting you about net neutrality and Title II. I want to implore
the commission to reverse the Obama/Wheeler order to regulation broadband. 
Citizens, rather than so-called experts, should be able to buy the services we prefer.
The Obama/Wheeler order to regulation broadband is a exploitation of net
neutrality. It disrupted a pro-consumer approach that performed exceptionally
successfully for decades with Republican and Democrat backing.
The simulator is available in Singer-Vine & Collier, supra note 30.
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deep fakes must be reviewed with the same care as the mass comments
that individuals have painstakingly personalized, to ensure that the
comment does not somehow identify a meaningful argument the agency
has not otherwise considered.55 Given the ease with which these fakes can
be produced, the cost to the agency could be quite significant, even if the
impact to the final agency rule would be virtually nonexistent in most 
cases.
There are comments, however, where the identity of the individual
commenting could make a big difference. A doctor writing about
difficulty prescribing a desired name-brand medication due to agency 
mandated bureaucratic steps should be viewed differently than a drug
company pretending to be a doctor writing in to complain about the same 
issue. And it is not merely cases where the commentor claims specific
credentials where this makes a difference; it can also be a claimed
personal identity, or specific situational knowledge or interests,56 such as 
a rancher commenting on grazing restrictions57 or a football fan 
concerned about what games are shown on local television.58 
In any of these situations, how an agency should view the comment
depends on whether the person making it in fact has the claimed expertise
or characteristics. While a single comment of this type would be unlikely
to impact the agency choice of action, fake comments compound this
problem by significantly increasing the possibility of broad-scale
comment manipulation. These types of comments, where the identity of
the commentor does make a difference because of a personal connection 
55. See Transcript, supra note 20, at 32–33 (reminding the audience that the purpose of
public comments “was to find out if there were some inconsistencies or issues that had been 
forgotten or just not properly addressed in the proposed rule”).
56. See id. at 61 (“[Y]ou look at the Coast Guard rule on anchorage locations, and the
person says: I use that. I use it in this way and this is why I boat this way in that location. That
comment is very useful, because it is personal experience that is going to help the agency 
understand the impact of the rule.”).
57. Id. at 102–03 (using the examples of a rancher explaining how they use a river and a
consumer saying which label style they prefer as situations where the identity of the 
commentor makes a difference to how the agency should interpret the comment).
58. When the FCC was considering rescinding the blackout rule, a rule that let NFL teams
prevent games from being shown on local television if a sufficient number of seats to the
game itself had not been sold, a number of fake comments were sent by supposed football
fans begging the FCC to keep the rule in place. These “fans” included fake names like Bilbo
Baggins as well as the names and addresses of real people who denied submitting the
comments. James V. Grimaldi & Paul Overberg, Another NFL Problem: Fake Fans Lobbying
the FCC—’Luke Skawalker,’ others send letters pleading to keep blackout rule, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 8, 2018, at A1.
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to the subject matter, are also likely to be the most useful type of comment 
submitted by members of the general public, since they provide the
agency with insight into the effect of the regulation on a specific subgroup
it might not otherwise easily learn about.
One proposed solution has been to have the agency remove the fake
comments. However, agencies have expressed concern that removing a 
fake comment (and thereby removing the argument made in that
comment, and so not considering it) could subject the agency to remand
on judicial review. This has led to an agency refusal to remove comments
identified as fraudulent. There has been little discussion of concern about 
remand over consideration of comments fraudulently attributed to
someone with specific situational experience.
The harm fake comments do to the general credibility of the agency
is equally problematic. Given the persistent belief among the public that 
comments are in a sense votes, the legitimacy of the entire process itself
can be questioned when it appears that the agency has followed the tenor
of demonstrably fake comments—that the rule appears to have been
decided by ballot stuffing.
True election fraud in the United States is vanishingly small, but it
remains a persistent concern among some segments of the population.59 
This likely contributed to the particular outrage with which the news of
fraudulent comments in the net neutrality rulemaking was greeted.60 
Fake comments significantly impact the public’s view of the
legitimacy of agency action. Even for those who understand how the
process works, it can be frustrating to feel that their single, heartfelt
comment has been drowned in a sea of fake comments.61 And this does
not even address the harm to individuals whose names were fraudulently
used to submit comments, an issue addressed in Section II.B.2.
59. Natasha Khan & Corbin Carson, Comprehensive Database of U.S. Voter Fraud
Uncovers No Evidence That Photo ID Is Needed, NEWS21 (Aug. 12, 2012, 10:39 AM) 
https://votingrights.news21.com/article/election-fraud/ (relaying the results of a study
conducted by New21 that found the rate of voter fraud to be “infinitesimal”); see also Opinion,
Election Fraud the G.O.P. Won’t Stress About: North Carolina Officials Present Evidence a
Republican Operative Stole a House Race, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2019, at A26 (“For years, 
Republicans have been in a tizzy over voter fraud by noncitizens, which they claim is eating
away at American democracy and helping Democrats.”).
60. See Singer-Vine & Collier, supra note 30.
61. Cf. id. (“It’s too easy to post fraudulent comments . . . . It gave us this impression that 
it didn’t matter how we actually felt.” (quoting a woman whose information was used in a
fraudulent comment)).
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B. How the Public is Affected by Mass and Fake Comments  
It is not only the general public opinion of agency action that is
affected by mass and fake comments—individual members of the public
are hurt by them as well.
A belief that comments are considered votes is one explanation for
commentors who submit multiple (identical) comments on a proposed
rule.62 In the extreme, individuals can submit well over 100 comments for 
a single rule.63 Would these individuals still be doing the same thing if
they understood that a comment does not count more, or more forcefully, 
the more times it is submitted?
The low informational value of mass comments means that the vast
majority of individuals submitting one are likely wasting their time.
However, given the even marginal informational gains for the agency
there can still be legitimate reasons to submit such comments.
However, individuals who submit the same comment repeatedly are
wasting their time without any informational gains for the agency, and
these are the individuals most hurt by (otherwise legitimate) mass
comments. It demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the role
that comments play in the system, and the power that comments have
within the rulemaking process.
This lack of information is not corrected by a system that seems to
62. The Case Against Mass E-mails, supra note 39, at 36 (“The top two submitters in
[one rulemaking] accounted for 261 and 314 e-mail comments, respectively.”).
63. The net neutrality rulemaking was one of the most high-profile in recent memory and 
is one that continues to receive comments nearly two years after comments closed. Restoring
Internet Freedom Docket 17-108, FCC Elec. Comment Filing Sys., 
https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/filings?proceedings_name=17-108&sort=date_disseminat
ed,DESC. Comments can be sorted by filer on the FCC website, where online comments were
accepted, allowing comments from a single individual to be identified and counted. Lindsey
Frohnen submitted 175 comments, all on a single day. Restoring Internet Freedom Docket
17-108, FCC Elec. Comment Filing Sys., https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/filings?express
_comment=0&filers_name=Lindsey%20Frohnen&limit=100&offset=0&proceedings_name
=17-108&sort=date_disseminated,DESC. While some of these appear to be blank, the
majority contained the same text through the same enclosed document: “Literally we need net
neutrality this is a free country and free speech and internet should be equal for all. C’mon 
guys, I mean, seriously. We need net neutrality.” E.g., Lindsay Frohnen, Comment Post on
Restoring Internet Freedom (May 9, 2017), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1050964840376/
Literally%20we%20need%20net%20neutrality%20this%20is%20a%20free%20country%20
and%20free%20speech%20and%20internet%20should%20be%20equal%20for%20all.docx.
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reward simply whoever can send in the highest total votes. Correcting
this misinformation could help clarify more broadly the role that
comments play in the administrative process and encourage more helpful
responses from the broader public.
Another problem with mass comments from the perspective of the
public is that these responses make it virtually impossible to see the
comments that will make a difference to the final agency action.
While all comments are made publicly accessible soon after receipt,
no distinction is drawn between the types of comments, so someone
looking to see what others have to say on the issue could scroll through 
dozens of pages on regulations.gov listing the exact same comment that
has been submitted by the exact same person hundreds of times.
Not only do these multiple submissions block access to alternatives
submitted, they further skew the public’s belief in the importance of mass 
comments, in part because the public view does not mirror the agency
view at all.
No one on the agency side will be scrolling through hundreds of
identical comments trying to determine which ones are different. Instead, 
algorithms work behind the scenes to compress these identical comments
into a single representative one, often without even the full list of
individuals submitting it (perhaps only the total number). Aligning the
public view with the agency view could help clarify the role that these
comments really play in agency action and allow members of the public 
who wished to be politically active to do so in ways more likely to
actually aid their cause.
While the individuals most affected by submitting mass comments
are those spending the time to submit the same response over and over
again, the individuals most affected by fake comments have often had no
voluntary association with the comment process at all. This is because
with fake comments, the most significant impact is on the people whose
names the fake comments are submitted under.64 This is particularly so
64. Comments are also submitted in the names of fictitious entities, such as Mickey
Mouse. While potentially humorous, this is less of a concern because: (1) it is generally
quickly apparent that these are fake comments, and (2) the fictitious entity involved by 
definition does not have personal feelings or opinions on the matter (although the company 
holding the copyright may not be entirely thrilled). See supra notes 25–27 (providing sample
comments from Mickey Mouse).
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when the view expressed in the fake comment is counter to the true
opinion held by the individual.65 
Individuals can be targeted for fake comments in two ways. First:
Some are simply the victims of data security breaches, and whoever
obtained their information did so based on the data from the breach.66 
Second: Individuals can also be personally targeted as the supposed
submitter, particularly when that individual is connected with the issue of
the rulemaking in some way. In these instances, the comments generally
express the opposite of the individual’s true position.67 
Comments submitted based on information from security breaches
can include the correct full name and address for each supposed
commentor.68 The individuals affected here may have no opinion on the
matter, but the tactic would presumably be more likely to be used to prop
up a less popular viewpoint. For a politically popular position, legitimate
commentors would presumably supply any desired volume, although it
was observed going both ways for the net neutrality rulemaking.69 
Many individuals are generally concerned about their privacy being
65. See Singer-Vine & Collier, supra, note 30 (describing a woman who discovered that 
her late mother’s personal information as well as her own had appeared in the net neutrality
rulemaking in comments strongly opposed to net neutrality. While she believed her mother,
when alive, had not had any feelings on the subject, the woman herself was strongly in favor
of retaining the neutrality regulations).
66. E.g., id. (describing the results of a BuzzFeed analysis showing that of the comments
coming from one suspicious source, 94% appeared to come from the Modern Business 
Solutions breach, while the remaining 6% recycled information commentors had submitted
in other rulemakings in 2016).
67. Karl Bode, The FCC Insists It Can’t Stop Impostors from Lying About My Views on
Net Neutrality, TECHDIRT (Jul. 11, 2017, 3:23AM) https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20170710/10071737756/fcc-insists-it-cant-stop-impostors-lying-about-my-views-net-
neutrality.shtml (describing his frustration “[a]s somebody that has spent the better part of
twenty years advocating for a healthy and open internet” to learn that someone else had
submitted a comment pretending to be him, pretending to “run an unlicensed political PAC”
and “prattle[ing] through a series of repeatedly, painstakingly debunked claims about how the 
agency’s arguably-modest rules somehow stifle investment, harm orphans, and damage the 
time-space continuum”)
68. E.g., Singer-Vine & Collier, supra note 30 (noting how closely many supposedly 
fraudulent comments matched data from the breach, including underscores rather than spaces
in addresses).
69. James V. Grimaldi & Paul Overberg, Fake Comments Hit Rule Making—Phony
Submissions Target Net Neutrality, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2017, at A1 (“The Journal found
instances of fakes that favored antiregulation stances but also comments mirroring consumer-
groups’ pro-regulation talking points, posted without permission of people whose names were
on them.”)
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protected online.70 An individual may never know that a comment was
submitted on their behalf, but they could be affected later if someone else
comes across it while searching the internet and views it as an accurate
representation of their feelings. In such polarizing times, someone who
has tried to remain off the internet would be understandably upset to be
on it at all, but it would be an even greater insult to be negatively affected 
by a comment that reflects views they do not agree with.
No one likes finding out their personal information was used in
support of something they did not intend, but it is worse for someone who
has worked for years to build a reputation in a certain area. They can be
extremely distressed to see their name used in a contrary argument.
Comments are not merely technically publicly available but are easily
accessible to the general public over the internet—unlike the old days of
reading rooms—and online identities are a critical part of people’s
reputations. Someone vehemently in favor of net neutrality, who has
published articles arguing in favor of net neutrality, will be
understandably upset to learn that their personal identity was used on a
comment arguing against net neutrality.71 
This harm is furthered by the seemingly cavalier attitude of the
agency. Due to concerns that a final result could be challenged if all
comments are not retained and accessible, the general agency response is
not to remove the comment or even the name from an allegedly fake
comment when contacted by the person impersonated, but to require that
individual to submit their own comment, under the same name, in which
the individual must explain that a comment was previously falsely
submitted by someone else and does not reflect their true view on the
issue, and then share their view.72 Even when this additional comment
70. Individuals may not necessarily fill out all the details of the comment, so someone
searching for John Smith online would not likely view a comment from someone named John
Smith as indicative. But there is a difference between John Smith supports the idea of allowing
alligators to count as passengers for HOV lanes and John Smith of 1234 Reptile Road in a 
given city does. But see generally Spyros Kokolakis, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy
Behaviour: A Review of Current Research on the Privacy Paradox Phenomenon, 64
COMPUTS. & SEC. 122 (2017) (surveying the literature on the “privacy paradox,” the fact that
“privacy is a primary concern for citizens in the digital age” and yet individuals generally do 
virtually nothing to secure their online privacy).
71. See Bode supra note 67.
72. Letter from G. Patrick Webre, Acting Chief, FCC Consumer & Governmental Affairs
Bureau to Karl Bode (July 10, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/3891550/FCC.pdf (“To that end we continue to encourage you and all members
of the public to submit comments to the FCC via ECFS [electronic comment filing system]
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has been submitted, there is nothing done by the agency to make clear to 
someone reading the first comment submitted that it has been countered
by an additional comment of the opposite opinion. Someone stumbling 
on that first comment has no way to know it has been explicitly 
disclaimed by the named individual.
C. How Third-Party Interest Groups are Affected by Mass and Fake 
Comments 
Third-party interest groups, or third-party groups, are the umbrella
term used in this Article to encompass both organized and more loosely
associated organizations with an interest in the outcome of the agency
rulemaking. This term includes nonprofits, like the Sierra Club, but is not
exclusively restricted to nonprofits. It, instead, applies to any group
soliciting others to comment and providing a possible option for the
comment submitted. A business seeking to have customers submit
comments would qualify as a third-party group,73 even though the 
business itself could submit its own comment as well. These are treated 
as a single class of interests because they are the driving force behind
mass comments. Individuals will not all submit the same comment text if
not prompted to do so by some third party. A general exhortation to 
comment, without supplied text, would not count, since the comments
submitted would be entirely the words of those submitting (even if the
push for submission was not theirs entirely).74 Since the comments
that include accurate identifying information. This will ensure that the record reflects your
views. You are welcome to include your correspondence on this matter—including a
statement that the comment you reference were not filed by you—in ECFS for the public
record.”).
73. There are also instances where a business will simply “assume” that all of its
customers would agree with its position and make use of their information. Transcript, supra
note 20, at 20 (alluding to such a situation in response to regulations under the Military
Lending Act, where at least one customer said that not only had he not agreed for information 
to be submitted on his behalf but that he “did not like the experience [with the company] and
. . . was not a supporter of pulling back on the Military Lending Act restrictions”).
74. The most extreme example of this general exhortation to comment would be the net
neutrality comments prompted by Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, both in 2014, Last
Week Tonight with John Oliver: Net Neutrality, YOUTUBE (June 2, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpbOEoRrHyU [hereinafter Net I], and in 2017, Last
Week Tonight with John Oliver: Net Neutrality II, YOUTUBE (May 8, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=92vuuZt7wak&t=1s [hereinafter Net II]. Each time, John 
Oliver explained the impact the rulemaking could have before directing viewers to go to the 
FCC website to leave a comment. Net I (“We need you to get out there, and for once in your
lives focus your indiscriminate rage in a useful direction. Seize your moment my lovely
trolls.”); Net II (“I’m calling upon all of you, the internet time wasters, and troublemakers, to
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submitted would be unique, they would also not necessarily lend
themselves to processing the way traditional mass comments would. This
part first addresses the benefit that mass comments have for these third-
party groups before turning to the relatively little impact that fake
comments have on them.
The ability to submit mass comments in agency rulemakings has
been a tremendous opportunity for nonprofits and other external
organizations hoping to change government action. But this is not
because these organizations believe that the comments submitted will
significantly alter the final regulation.
Mass comment campaigns driven by the interest groups generally
involve policy-based arguments,75 the type of comment least likely to
have any effect on the final agency decision.76 This is not because interest
groups are unable to submit stronger, more substantive comments;77 it is
because the process produces a number of external benefits for the
organization.
First, when comments are submitted through the interest group’s
join me once more in just 5-10 minutes of minor effort.”). The first time, this was done with 
the direct FCC link displayed in the program. Net I. The second time, since the URL was
more complex, the show bought a secondary website (gofccyourself.com). Net II. But that
website automatically redirected to the FCC page for comment submission. In neither instance
was the public presented with a page already supplied with proposed text. Nor, in either
instance, was the comment process an attempt on the part of the show to capture any
information about the individuals commenting. While this undoubtedly resulted in a mass of
comments, they were not all identical comments originating from the same prepared text.
75. Mendelson, supra note 34, at 1346 (describing why these comments should still be
considered by rulemakers).
76. This was true even before the dawn of the internet. Food and Drug Administration,
Administrative Practices and Procedures, 40 Fed. Reg. 40681, 40688 (Sep. 3, 1975)
(“[R]epetitive comments would be given no more weight than a single comment, and indeed
that a single well-reasoned comment, relying upon sound data and information, would be
given far greater weight than a large number of form letters which simply support or oppose
a proposal in conclusory terms.”).
77. The Case Against Mass E-mails, supra note 39, at 30 n.7 (2009) (“In a focus group,
a member of a national wildlife organization noted the split between the policy and grassroots 
staff members. Grassroots organizers see the e-mail campaign tools as a low-cost, high-return
method to retain and attract members. Policy specialists, who prepare the group’s longer
scientific and legal briefs for the agency, see little value added in the rulemaking process when 
duplicative, non-substantive comments come from the membership. When policy specialists 
ask the grassroots organizers to encourage the members to write better comments, there is 
considerable tension.”).
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website, rather than through regulations.gov, it is the interest group that
provides the form to fill out, and collects the information submitted.78 
Some agencies allow anonymous comments.79 The same is not true
when the comment is submitted through the interest group’s website.80 
Gathering this information allows the interest group to identify someone
willing to take at least a token action in favor of a cause. The information
can then be used by the interest group to push for greater involvement
with the group or for monetary solicitations.
Indeed, a request for donations is often present on the comment
submission page itself81 or appears on the confirmation page showing the
comment has been submitted. An individual motivated enough to submit
a comment might well also be motivated enough to submit a donation or
do something else to further the group’s cause.82 
78. Id. at 29 (2009) (“The appearance, therefore, can be that the public comment exercise 
is just an efficient front-end for a more serious back-end data mining operation geared toward
membership and donation campaigns.”).
79. See id. (Noting, in particular, that “the EPA is well known (for many good reasons)
as an agency that considers anonymous comments.”). This is particularly relevant as the EPA
is one of the primary targets of many environmentally oriented mass comment campaigns. 
And it is far from the only agency to accept mass comments. See also, e.g., Control Date for
the Northeast Multispecies Charter/Party Fishery; Northeast Multispecies Fishery
Management Plan; Correction, 83 Fed. Reg. 14236, 14236 (Apr. 3, 2018) (“[The National
Marine Fisheries Service] will accept anonymous comments (enter ‘N/A’ in the required
fields if you wish to remain anonymous).”).
80. E.g., Don’t Let President Trump’s EPA Put Drinking Water At Risk, SIERRA CLUB,
https://addup.sierraclub.org/campaigns/dont-let-president-trumps-epa-put-drinking-water-at-
risk (requiring contact information including physical address, phone number, and email for 
comments being sent to the EPA, an agency that allows mass comments.) The page notes that
“All fields required unless noted otherwise.” Id. (No fields are noted otherwise.) After the 
statement is a question mark icon. Hovering over this icon produces the following text,
“Recipients often require this information in order to accept your message, so we have to
require it too.” Id. An argument could be made that it is too difficult for the agency to 
determine whether or not anonymous comments are accepted for each rulemaking, but this
would not be true for agencies with which the group frequently sends comments to (such as
the EPA). Instead, it can reasonably be understood that there is no incentive for the Sierra
Club not to require this information.
81. E.g., Tell the Feds to Protect Water and Wildlife: No Jordan Cove, CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://act.biologicaldiversity.org/onlineactions/nJb-IUkNf0ubPuF
k8DVxOg2 (including a link at the bottom of the page to “Donate now to support the Center’s
work”).
82. The page showing the comment was submitted in the campaign referenced in the
preceding note included options for donating $100, $35, or another amount. See id; see also
Transcript, supra note 20, at 146 (“So the Sierra Club might see, oh, you are willing to submit
and be part of our mass comment campaign. Now let’s see if you are willing to host a meeting
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Similarly, these pages encourage commentors to “[p]lease share this
action with your friends and family on social media,”83 reinforcing the
belief among the public that the number of comments will make a
difference to the final agency action.
Even if the third-party group does not receive a donation from the
commentor, or additional members if the commentor shares the page, the 
group itself can gain further influence based on the number of comments
submitted through its site (or otherwise directly tied to it). Interest groups
often use the number of comments they have encouraged supporters to 
submit as a demonstration of their effectiveness that can then be used to
justify further solicitations from members (to ensure the group is able to
continue to do such good work).
Finally, to the extent that second-order participation is a concern 
when an interest group submits a comment, a group submitting a
comment that is also submitted by a large number of individuals makes
clear that, at a minimum, those individuals also share the concern.84 
Therefore, these third-party organizations stand in opposition to the
general public and the agencies as mass comments, for them, are not only 
incredibly helpful, they are increasingly becoming an important part of
their business plans.
A distinction should be drawn at this point between fake comments
the organization has directly attempted to obtain,85 and organizations that
are using the comment process to solicit information on those interested
in further commitment to the cause. The second type stand little to gain
from fake comments, as the information will not allow them to connect
at your house at some later point in time.”).
83. This was the wording used in the same campaign and was immediately followed on
the same page by links to twitter and Facebook. See Tell the Feds to Protect Water and
Wildlife, supra note 81.
84. See generally, Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63
UCLA L. REV. 1300 (2016) (explaining how it can be difficult for interest groups to show to 
what extent the position of the group represents the position of the members of the group).
85. Commentors can be bought fairly cheaply. See Media Bridge, How to Take on the
Government . . . and Win, MEDIABRIDGE (Sept. 21, 2015) http://web.archive.org/web/
20160831212333/http://www.mediabridgellc.com/1033 (“With Media Bridge, you get what
you pay for with our Cost-Per-Action pricing. That means what you only pay for results.
Spend a million dollars with Media Bridge, and most likely, you’ll have a million people + 
advocating for your position.”).
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with an individual interested in taking further action. However, an
individual committed, on their own initiative, to repeatedly using the
form to submit comments under different names might be identified as
potentially being particularly receptive to opportunities for further action.
Organizations also boast about the number of comments they have
encouraged others to submit to a given rulemaking,86 so allowing those
numbers to be artificially inflated by the over-enthusiastic action of a few
members provides little downside to the organization, particularly when
none of the members of that organization will ever see the list, they will
only see the total number submitted showing how successful the
organization is. That does not mean that these organizations would put
deliberate time or effort into seeking out lists of fake participants, but that
there is no reason for the organization to specifically go to extra effort to
encourage each commentor to leave one and only one comment in their
own name.
Given the relatively little benefit traditional non-profits get from
fake comments, these organizations would have little reason to push to
retain them, particularly given their political unpopularity. Public
discovery or acknowledgment that fake comments were submitted on 
behalf of an organization can also hurt the reputation of that organization,
especially when the little probative value of the comments themselves are
considered. However, unlike members of the public, who can be 
extremely negatively impacted by fake comments, and the agencies,
which must deal with fake comments, even if they are dealt with through
computer processes behind the scenes, the third-party organizations
responsible for many of the fake comments suffer little ill effect and
consequently currently have the least incentive to control them. Thus
necessitating the solutions described in Part III.
III. HOW TO SOLVE MASS AND FAKE COMMENTS 
Changes to the comment submission process at the federal level
could help solve the problems caused by both mass comments and fake 
comments. The harm from mass comments would be reduced by allowing
commentors to sign onto comments submitted by others rather than
submitting their own unique comment. The harm from fake comments 
86. See e.g., Don’t Let Trump’s EPA Allow More Dirty, Climate-Disrupting Coal Plants!,
SIERRA CLUB https://addup.sierraclub.org/campaigns/dont-let-trumps-epa-allow-more-dirty-
climate-disrupting-coal-plants (last visited Mar. 23, 2021) (showing that the organization had 
already submitted nearly 60,000 messages of a 50,000 message goal).
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would be reduced by allowing commentors the option to verify their
identity as part of the comment submission process. These solutions are
explored in greater detail in this section.
A. How to Solve Mass Comments 
Many of the problems caused by mass comments would be reduced
if not entirely eliminated by abandoning the notion that each submission
must be considered its own unique comment and converting otherwise
identical submissions to additional signatures to a single comment. This
section expands this solution. It first describes it in more detail, explains 
why it would solve the problems caused by mass comments, and explains 
what it would actually look like for those commenting. It then briefly
explains why it is better to use a solution like this, in which it is no more 
difficult to comment than it currently is, to solve mass comments, rather
than suggestions that have in some way attempted to raise the
requirements for commenting and thereby prevent or reduce mass
comments. Finally, it explains why the solution in this Article would be
acceptable to the three interested parties: the agencies, members of the 
public, and the third-party interest groups driving the mass comment
phenomenon.
This Article argues that right now the best option for dealing with
mass comments, the option that would not raise the bar for comments
from individuals with relevant personal experience while best addressing
the problems of public access and understanding, would be to allow
individuals to sign on to comments submitted by other individuals rather
than submit their own identical comment.
This would require only minor changes at regulations.gov.
Comments are already given unique internet addresses once submitted,
so it would be straightforward to allow additional signatures based on a
particular comment. This process would be even more straightforward for
outside websites that interface with regulations.gov, since those websites
could look identical to the members of the public and it would be on the 
back end that the change was made from submitting the information as a
comment to submitting it as an additional signature to a comment
(presumably to a comment initially submitted by the interest group).
As is repeated by all scholars in this area of law, comments are not
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votes. One man one vote is a sacred construct in American law,87 but just
as there is no reason now why a comment cannot be signed by more than
one person before it is submitted, there is no reason why the agency 
cannot facilitate this after the comment has been submitted.
The typical mass commentor is an individual who was offered the
option of submitting a comment by an organization the individual trusts
or believes in, and so the individual submits that single comment.
This person would have exactly the same experience signing onto
the comment of someone else (such as the organization), particularly if
that individual were submitting the comment through the organization’s
website where they could fill in forms that look identical to the current
version.
Then there are the commentors who take it a step further. An
individual who believes that the number of total comments makes a
difference might well decide to “stuff the ballot box” and submit that
comment not once, where it clearly will make little difference to the 
overall outcome, but potentially hundreds of times. While these identical 
comments can easily be collapsed in the agency view, the mere fact that
they were submitted indicates that the person doing so has no
understanding of how the comment process works and, as a consequence,
wasted all the time submitting those comments.
Having individuals sign on to comments submitted by others could
solve this. Not only would it be possible to only let one person sign a
comment one time (using the same information), the individual could be 
notified that further comments weren’t accepted, freeing them to do
something more productive with their time. In essence, the structure of
the comments would change in a way less likely to encourage this ballot 
stuffing, with an additional educational component explaining that an
additional identical signature would not be added since someone can only
sign once. This would help bring the public understanding of comment
structure and function in the agency more in line with what actually
happens, unlike the current version of regulations.gov, which can be so 
clogged with mass comments that it is difficult to find anything else.
87. See Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964)). The distinction between comments and votes means that there is no reason
to require a unique individual submission from each person wishing to comment on proposed
regulations.
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However, this only works for individuals interested in submitting
one (or more) comments in their own name. Individuals concerned about
an issue might take a different approach to stuffing the ballot box. Rather 
than submit their own identical comment repeatedly, they could submit 
comments in the names of others. Merely changing from everyone 
submitting their own individual comment to signing onto the comment of
another does not alter the incentive for the submission of fake names.
Preventing the submission of fake names is addressed instead in Section
III.B.
Thus far, the solution has simply been described as signing on to
comments left by another. At a basic level, it is exactly as described.
Individuals would be able to sign on to a comment submitted by another 
individual or organization, as opposed to the current system where
everyone must submit their own comment. This section explains in
greater detail what that would mean.88 
There would be restrictions on the practice. First, one could only
sign on to a comment in support. There would be no option to express 
disagreement with a comment. (Such disagreement would need to be
expressed in a separately submitted comment to the agency.) Also,
individuals would only be able to sign on to top level comments. That is, 
one could not sign on in support of a comment in support of another
comment (and so on down the line). This would make it easier to review
comments, as described in the following section, and simplify the 
explanation to users of the site.
There have long been calls made to take advantage of the internet to
facilitate discussions in the comments.89 That is not what this Article
proposes. A dialogue would change the system far more significantly
since it would place an expectation that an original commentor return to
the website to reengage in the discussion. Instead, this proposal is
designed to retain the current structure, where information flows in a
single direction from the public back to the agency in the comment
process.
88. Since the website changes necessary to implement these suggestions would not
require a significant reworking of the entire system, this section addresses broad design rather 
than specific logistics.
89. See Zavestoski et al., supra note 18, at 392 (2006) (referencing others arguing that
the internet would enable a new form of dialogue).
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In practice, individuals could find a comment they agreed with (or 
follow a link to a particular comment that had been sent to them) and then
select a box saying they wanted to sign that comment as well. The 
individual would then follow a link to a page signing on to that comment, 
where they would be able to provide personal information. This page
would also have a space to add any additional comments. Or, as
mentioned, an interest group could construct a site visually identical to
what the group now has in place except that the submission to the agency
would be as an additional signature rather than as a separate comment.
The most pressing question would be whether to consolidate
identical or highly similar comments that were not submitted as
additional signatures but rather as unique original comments.
Consolidating identical comments on the front end (so that it appeared to
be one comment with multiple additional people signing on to it, as is
effectively currently done on the back end when the comments are 
presented to the agency) would enable the public to better understand 
how such comments were viewed by the agency, as discussed in Section 
III.A.5.b. Combining comments in this manner would also reduce any
incentive to submit extra comments rather than extra signatures. Just as
agencies can currently group comments that are highly similar for
review,90 highly similar but not identical comments could similarly be
turned into additional signatures (with additional commentary) to further
bring the public view in line with the agency view.
Concerns about mass comments have led to calls for changes to the
current system. As mentioned in the prior section, there have long been 
calls to allow commentors to engage in dialogue, a proposal that would
radically alter the current comment structure.91 
One different particularly persistent suggestion has been to separate
out true substantive comments from mass comments.92 This could
initially seem promising. As described in II.A.1, mass comments do little
90. Transcript, supra note 20, at 82 (describing how agencies are allowed to set the
similarity percentage for “de-duplication,” although most set it at 70).
91. Id. at 78 (referencing others arguing that the internet would enable a new form of
dialogue).
92. Daniel E. Rauch, Two-Track E-Commenting, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 303, 304–05 (2016)
(suggesting that mass comment “spam” be removed from the primary comment track and
relegated to a secondary “preference” track).
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to influence the final agency action. The comments that are likely to affect 
the final rule tend to be far more detailed and legalistic. However, raising
the bar to comments would further entrench a system that already rewards
the most sophisticated players. 
There is little doubt that a comment such as “Do NOT make ANY
changes to the Clean Water Act, you absolute morons”93 is not going to
change the final rule in any way and will likely not even be seen by
anyone at the agency.94 It would also seem relatively simple to filter out
such comments by requiring something as simple as even one relevant
citation in the comment. Such a requirement would screen out comments
like the one listed above.95 However, even this low bar could also exclude
comments by unsophisticated lay people who could be directly impacted
by the rule.
For instance, a trucker concerned about mandatory rest time might
have relevant personal experience to share directly related to such a
requirement without knowing how to include citation to the specific area
of concern.96 In contrast, those with legal or lobbying connections, the
93. Anonymous, Comment Post on Revised Definition of Waters of the United States
(May 7, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149-9363.
94. Assuming that the agency is using outside contractors to review many of the mass
comments, as described in notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
95. Or, less frequently, converted by the commentor to something more like “Do NOT
make ANY changes to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1251–1387, you absolute morons.”
96. See, e.g., Tony Young, Comment Post on Proposed Rule ANPRM: Hours of Service
of Drivers (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FMCSA-2018-0248-
0264. The comment is reproduced in full below, including errors in the original. While there
are no citations or direct reference to any portion of the proposed rules, Mr. Young provides 
real life examples of the consequences of the current rule requiring ten-hour breaks, a
requirement the agency was specifically reevaluating:
Dear sir ,
I am a trucker of 30 yrs. I have worked hard in this business to get to where i am
today . I would like to explain how these current rules and regulations affect me. 
We start are days sitting at shipper or recievers for hrs upon hrs waiting to unload ,
reload to only realize our day is about shot . Then we drive 4 maybe 6 hrs untill we
have to take our 10 . Not being tired we are up until we get tired only to find we
only got a few hrs before we have to start racing the clock because we couldnt get
no where the day before. Now fighting morning rush hr where we could manage
our time before ELD. we are having to drive faster , and more tired than ever before
. NOT SAFE at all. I personally cant stand the ELD but i believe with the right 
reciepe it would be a good thing. There are more accidents than ever before , i know
you have noticed. RAY CHARLES could see it. We all want safety but the way it
is now its not . Wait until winter comes it is going to be scary. Im asking you make
changes before more people are hurt by this little black box. Thanks for listening.
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players already submitting the types of comments most likely to be
considered by the agency,97 are presumably including such citations as a 
matter of course,98 further dividing the commenting abilities of highly
sophisticated commercial interests from less sophisticated individuals 
facing significant consequences as a result of new regulations.
Increased public participation has been sought through efforts like
the Regulation Room that engaged moderators to help guide comments
from interested members of the public.99 While there seemed to be
somewhat promising success with earlier trials (in that the researchers 
were able to engage people who might not have otherwise participated in
the comment process),100 the time investment required of those directing
the project mean that such a goal is unlikely to be put into broad 
practice.101 
There have also been calls to put in place some other low hurdle to
participation, like charging the cost of a stamp to submit a comment,
under the belief that those submitting fake comments are doing so only 
because submission in the current system is free.102 But this
misunderstands the problem. Meaningless spam comments (composed of
things like meaningless strings of symbols), the most likely comments to
be eliminated by a charge, can be filtered by computer.103 It is the higher
value comments, like the deep fakes, that consume agency resources. The
97. See Cuéllar, supra note 36.
98. Cf. Stephen M. Johnson, #Betterrules: The Appropriate Use of Social Media in 
Rulemaking, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1379, 1387–88 (2017) (noting that agencies also have
particular reason to pay attention to the submissions of sophisticated parties because they are
also the most likely to challenge the rule in court).
99. Rulemaking 2.0, supra note 37, at 432–33 (2011) (explaining how the role of 
moderators was primarily to “mentor[] more effective ways of commenting, and nudg[e] users
toward broader engagement”).
100. Id. at 431 (describing how the group experienced increased success by adding an
online poll to the initial welcome page).
101. Id. at 443–44 (acknowledging that the group’s desire for “more better” participation 
was almost certainly at odds with a goal of cost savings).
102. See Harold Furchtgott-Roth, How to Reduce Frivolous Comments in Federal
Proceedings, HUDSON INSTITUTE (July 21, 2017), https://www.hudson.org/
research/13779-how-to-reduce-frivolous-comments-in-federal-proceedings (“Abuse of
federal dockets by computer-generated filings was not a problem when ordinary Americans
had to submit filings on paper and affix a postage stamp to an envelope. Today, such abuse is
a problem.”).
103. Transcript, supra note 20, at 63–64 (describing spam comments as containing links
to porn cites, single words, or random punctuation).
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cost of a stamp (currently $.55) is less than half what companies are 
already paying for fake comments. A company willing to spend $1
million for “a million people +” likely would not be too bothered
spending $1.5 million for “a million people +.”104 At the same time, the
difficulty of paying even a nominal charge could be off-putting to 
legitimate commentors. Some may not feel they have any money to spare
while others might simply have no way to convey small sums of money 
to a government entity online. It is easy to have a pack of stamps lying
around the house and stick one on when needed. However, a stamp cannot
simply be stuck to the computer screen, and the transaction itself would
be a barrier for those engaged in single comment submission. In this case,
it would actually be easier for companies submitting many comments to
pay the larger total sum using a credit card than someone who is unbanked 
and uses cash for everything but is trying to submit a single comment
online.105 
In order to ensure that individuals with unique perspectives who
would be directly impacted by a regulation are not excluded from a
rulemaking process, the bar to comment submission should not be raised.
Keeping the bar low ensures that important comments from
unsophisticated parties can be accepted and potentially considered. A low
bar does not do anything to stem the vast numbers of repetitive comments
of little substantive value. However, as discussed, agencies are generally 
able to process these comments behind the scenes already, viewing them
merely as duplicate submissions. This Article proposes that the idea of 
commenting be reconfigured so that the public has the same 
understanding of these comments: that they are effectively one comment
signed on to by many people.
This is exactly the type of revision that the modern internet is tailor-
made for. Given that comments are understood not to be votes, it is
strange that the system still seems to require each individual to submit an 
individual comment.
Changing to a system where individuals can sign on to comments,
but where there is no substantive bar to commenting, would keep the
comment process open and benefit each of the interest groups, as
discussed in the next section.
104. See Media Bridge, supra note 85.
105. Physically mailing in a comment is not as easy as it might have once been either. Not
everyone has legible handwriting or home printers to put the comment to paper.
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Switching to this type of system would be a win-win-win for all
interested parties. As discussed further below, agencies would find the
comment review process streamlined, and could even receive more useful
comments. The public would have a better understanding of how these 
comments were being viewed by the agency, might understand better
how to submit truly substantive comments that would better assist the
agency, and would have an easier time viewing the range of comments
submitted to the agency. Finally, interest groups would more directly be
able to claim the number of individuals supporting their position, while 
retaining all benefits they enjoy under the current system.
Agencies are able to handle many of the problems of duplicative
comments behind the scenes, ensuring the agency does not need to re-
read comments that are identical.106 The same software can also mark
which passages are identical when the comments are not an exact
match.107 
However, someone is still required to review all of these similar but
not identical comments.108 The system proposed, in which commentors
are asked to submit a complete separate statement in support of a 
comment, if desired, would ensure that the additional supportive
statements were coherent by themselves. Currently, as discussed in
II.A.1, a commentor wishing to submit a mass comment is often told to
add personal details by the organization behind the mass comment. These 
comments may be added anywhere in the submitted comment including 
being sprinkled throughout the boilerplate text.
While software can identify identical portions in merely similar
comments, the reviewer cannot ignore all identical portions if the unique 
additional sections are interwoven with them. Someone reviewing such 
comments must spend additional time with at least some of the comments
106. See Transcript, supra note 20, at 37–38 (acknowledging that a human could not have
read all 22 million comments in the net neutrality rulemaking).
107. Id. at 41 (“[W]e go through and present to the comment reader the exact text with
unique material highlighted, and a count. . . . [T]his lets the agency focus on what the unique
elements are in a way that if they actually had to read through all of these things, they might
miss.”).
108. Id. at 91–92 (describing the importance of a thorough review of mass comments
during OIRA review of the final rule).
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in which the additions have been sprinkled throughout to understand the
context in which the additions are made.
The proposed system, where additional comments can only be added
separately from the original text, would reduce this reviewing burden by
ensuring that the additional text is coherent by itself and eliminate the 
need to review any of the original mass comment text.
This could also be useful for comment submissions from loosely
organized groups like trade associations, as opposed to the current
practice of sending out suggested text and then encouraging members to 
add their own comments, which are also sprinkled throughout the trade
association’s prepared text when submitted.109 
Agencies could also push the public to make these additional
comments more useful by reminding commentors what types of
comments from them would in fact be of most assistance to the agency
on the secondary page.
The agency could even seed the process by including some initial
comments expressing expected views to allow commentors to sort their
additional comments by topic and allow the additional comments to be 
more focused and on point.
The agency generally does not see multiple copies of identical
comments. Instead, a single copy of the comment is shown with the 
notation that a certain number are similar.110 This means that ten thousand
submissions of an identical comment are understood to be a large number
of identical submissions, but the agency does not need to interact with the
full number.
However, a member of the public viewing the docket at
regulation.gov, does need to interact with these identical comments if
they wish to view comments submitted. These can clog the system from
109. Id. at 34–35 (confessing that a trade organization views comments submitted from
multiple sources as more persuasive than a single comment with multiple signers. The trade 
organization therefore provides templates for comments to members and encourages them to 
personalize their submissions).
110. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-1: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
IN E-RULEMAKING: ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 4 (2011) (“While 5 U.S.C. § 553 
requires agencies to consider all comments received, it does not require agencies to ensure
that a person reads each one of multiple identical or nearly identical comments.”). However,
not having anyone read something that is only similar could result in the agency missing a
substantive point.
   
        
        
           
        
         
      
           
        
      
         
    
           
           
           
      
         
        
           
      
   
           
           
         
          
         
       c. It Would Benefit Third-Party Interest Groups
         
            
         
               
         
       
             
         
 
             
 
794 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69
the public’s viewpoint, making it difficult to understand the opinions and
positions of those not submitting these mass comments.
Displaying all comments in the current manner can make the mass
comment campaigns seem like an overwhelming show of force to
viewers. This viewpoint is completely at odds with the way the same
comments will be viewed by the agency.
Changing the system so the public understands that the substance of
the comment is what will be considered would help clarify that quantity
does not trump quality. It would also help those individuals who currently 
“vote early and vote often” to understand that they are not making their
point more forcefully by repeatedly sending in the same message.
The agency could also help push those commentors who wished to
add additional thoughts to a comment they were signing to do so in a 
manner that would provide more useful information to the agency. This
could be done by reminding those adding their signatures that any 
additional information will be most useful when it deals with specific 
experiences the individuals have, rather than general policy arguments.
Since the public is presumably commenting in hopes of influencing the
final outcome, enabling more effective commenting would directly
benefit those engaged in it.
Changing the system so that unique comments can more easily be
seen by individuals could also help foster at least some of the responses 
to comments hoped for by e-rulemaking cheerleaders early in the 
process,111 since it is difficult to understand and respond to the arguments 
of the other side when those arguments cannot be found.
The strong benefits interest groups enjoy under the current system,
which have to this point been the driving force behind mass comments,
would not change under the new system as proposed.
To the extent that the goal of the groups is simply to show the desire
of the portion of the public willing to send in comments, the effect on the
agency would be the same. The agency would see the comment officially
submitted by the group, as well as the number of people signing on to it,
something that is already being done in some instances by outside groups 
111. See Zavestoski et al., supra note 18, at 392 (referencing others arguing that the
internet would enable a new form of dialogue).
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of their own initiative.112 The other benefits of these outside groups would
not be affected either.
Just as interest groups can now use their own website to allow
individuals to comment on the regulations.gov website, they could collect 
additional signatures to their comment through dedicated pages on their
site. This would allow them to collect the same information and make the
same pushes for donations and expanded outreach that they currently do
without requiring the person to go through a single additional link.
It would even strengthen the ability of the groups to use comments
submitted as a show of strength. Rather than explain that the group
encouraged the submission of X number of comments, the group could
boast that X number of people were mobilized to sign on to its comment.
Retaining the current benefits for the interest groups would be
critical, since without buy-in from this group there would be little reason
to expect interest groups to create the pages allowing additional 
signatures rather than simply maintain the status quo, where the groups
push individuals to submit identical comments that clog the system with 
little benefit to the rulemaking process.
Fake comments are such a problem because in the current process
all of the information submitted by the commentor is self-identified. The
solution to fake comments, therefore, is to allow the commentor the
option to verify their identity when submitting a comment. This section 
describes in more detail how this would work.
Reducing the problem with fake comments would be as
straightforward as for mass comments. Creating a verification method
and then placing a mark (as simple as a green dot) next to comments (or
additional signatures, if the mass proposal were adopted) that have been
112. Press Release, World Wildlife Fund, More than One Million Sign on to Stop Elephant
Slaughter: WWF Hands Over Record Signatures to Stop Illegal Ivory Trade (Sept. 28, 2015),
https://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/more-than-one-million-sign-on-to-stop-elephant-
slaughter (describing how the WWF obtained more than one million signatures in response to
a proposed rule by the Fish and Wildlife Service). The loose distinction organizations can
draw between mass comments and signatures is shown by the organization alternatively 
saying that this is the first time more than one million comments have been attributable to a 
single organization in a Fish and Wildlife Service rulemaking. See id.
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verified would raise the value of these comments. This in turn would 
comparatively lower the value of unverified comments, even though they
could still be allowed.
Verification would reduce the incentive for both types of fake 
comments—those intended to hurt particular individuals and those done
in an attempt to fool others into believing a position has greater support 
than it in fact does.
Reams of unverified comments for a position, particularly when the
proportion of verified comments was significantly different than 
comments going the other way, would start to look very suspicious,
further lowering their value and thereby reducing the incentive to submit
large numbers of fake comments to begin with.
Comments intended to hurt someone would also have less of an
impact under a verified system. Not only would it be clear if both
comments were seen during a search for which one was the correct one,
but someone stumbling across only the fake comment would be able to 
tell from the lack of a verification mark that there was reason to be
suspicious about it.
And this, like the solution to mass comments discussed earlier, could
be done without any change in the ability of individuals currently 
submitting comments to continue doing so.
Adding a verified mark to comments would at a minimum reduce
fake comments by eliminating part of the incentive for them as well as
providing better protection to those currently being hurt by them.
Those currently hurt—individuals in whose name a fake comment is
submitted—would have greater protection because someone seeing only
the fake comment would have an immediate warning that the comment 
may not be authentic. This would be further reinforced in instances where
the targeted individual chose to submit their own unique comment. Now
someone viewing the two comments would immediately be able to tell
which was the correct one, further lowering the value of the fake
comment.
The reduced value these fake comments offer would also reduce the 
incentive for them to be submitted to begin with. Currently there is no
way to immediately distinguish mass comments solicited from a large
group of supporters and faked mass comments. While there are some
signals (such as all originating from a particular IP address) there are also
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legitimate reasons for that, since as explained in Section II.C.1, outside
organizations are specifically enabled to connect to regulations.gov for
comment submission directly from the organization’s website,113 and
there are incentives for the organization to do it that way because of the
additional information they are able to gather.114 
While merely adding a verification mark would not eliminate fake
comments, as long as comments can be submitted without verification
(and they would be, in part for reasons discussed in Section III.B), it
would dramatically reduce the harm they can currently cause for
individuals falsely claimed to be the submitter and should reduce the
overall number of such comments.
The initial design questions would be (1) when the mark should be
visible and (2) whether the absence of the mark should be conspicuously 
noted.
To be most effective, the verification mark should be displayed both
if the comment is viewed individually (as its own unique webpage) or in
a list of comments at regulations.gov. This will ensure that regardless of
how someone finds the comment, they can immediately tell that it is
verified.
To further reinforce this fact, the location for the mark should be
obvious, so that the lack of a verification mark is immediately apparent
to someone seeing the comment out of context—further protection for 
those who are trying to overcome a false comment submitted in their
name. Any solution would also need to determine the core components
of the process: how to verify someone’s identity, and what to do if
someone cannot verify their identity, the subjects for the remaining part
of this section.
The current federal government recommendations are (1) that
identity verification be centralized, absent a compelling reason to do
otherwise115 and (2) that this verification occur through official
113. See Public notice and comment rulemaking, supra note 23.
114. See supra Section II.C.1.
115. Paul A. Grassi et al., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-63-3: Digital Identity
Guidelines, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
(June 2017), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-3.pdf.
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documents, rather than the knowledge-based questions that have become
common.116 It is thus necessary to first examine whether there is a
compelling reason not to use centralized verification in comment
submission.
There is an important distinction between identification for verifying
comments and the more common reasons for identity verification at the
federal level. Generally, an individual will seek to verify an identity to
obtain some service or benefit from the government and will be creating 
an account that there is reason to believe they will want to return to, like
with the Social Security Administration to check their benefit status.117 
While some commentors may want to comment on different rulemakings
over time, others may just wish to submit a single comment, so the same
type of verification may not be necessary.
However, since the goal of the process is in fact to validate the
identity, and the work necessary to do it a single time for a single
submission would not necessarily be less than the work needed to enter a
larger federal ecosystem that would allow repeated submissions with
little additional verification needed, there does not appear to be a
compelling reason not to use central government verification. This is
particularly so since in some cases the proposed regulations at issue
would involve the same agencies individuals were otherwise seeking to
validate their identity with.
Fortunately, federal identity verification is one area where
technology used by the federal government has made dramatic strides in
recent years.118 This is a good thing, given that the current government
recommendation is also that identity verification for federal purposes be
centralized.119 Login.gov has been created as a central federal
Although the guidelines say they are agnostic as to whether identity should be federated, they
also say “identity federation is preferred over a number of siloed identity systems that each
serve a single agency.” Id.
116. See generally Data Protection: Federal Agencies Need to Strengthen Online Identity
Verification Processes, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, (May 2019),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699195.pdf (highlighting the need for federal agencies to 
move away from knowledge-based verification).
117. Id. at i (“[T]he Social Security Administration (SSA) uses this technique to verify the
identities of individuals seeking access to the “My Social Security” service, which allows
them to check the status of benefit applications, request a replacement Social Security or
Medicare card, and request other services.”).
118. Id. at 15 (“Recently developed technology allows an agency to remotely examine a 
physical credential, such as a driver’s license or a passport, to verify an individual’s identity.”)
119. See Grassi et al., supra note 115.
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identification site.120 
Login.gov is also using the recommended form of verification— 
verification based on documents that can be checked with the issuing 
institution, rather than social security numbers or other information that 
could be obtained for a fee on the dark web.121 The move to this
document-based verification is recent, but lines up well with the current 
recommendations.122 Using a central verification method also means that
it would be relatively easy to add verification, since the entire process
would not need to be recreated from scratch for regulations.gov.
Any systematic push for verification, particularly when that
verification is to be through official government identification 
documents, must acknowledge that doing so will inevitably affect some
population groups more than others.
Concern about unequal access to government identification is a 
concern about unequal access to the benefit guarded by the verification.
While this is a concern, and approaches in general through the federal
government to provide alternative methods of secure verification could
120. Login.gov Partners, LOGIN.GOV, https://www.partners.login.gov/ (last visited Mar. 
27, 2021).
121. Paul A. Grassi et al., NIST Special Publication 800-63A, Digital Identity Guidelines:
Enrollment and Identity Proofing, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE (June 2017, updated Mar. 3, 2020), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63a.pdf at 20 (“Information accessible freely, for a fee in
the public domain, or via the black market SHALL NOT be used.”).
122. See id. at 6 (providing a good run-through of the three stages of the “identity proofing
process”). In the resolution phase, a credential service provider (CSP) collects basic
information from the applicant and pictures of the applicant’s identity evidence “such as a
driver’s license and a passport.” Id. In the validation phase the CSP checks that the documents
do not appear to be altered and verifies the information on them with the issuing entity. Id.
Finally, in the verification stage, the CSP asks for an additional picture of the applicant and
checks it against the picture on the documents. If they match, an enrollment code is sent “to
the validated phone number of the applicant, the user provides the enrollment code to the 
CSP, and the CSP confirms they match.” Id. At this point the identity has been officially
verified. Id. There is also a concern about reducing the risk of impersonation, the major
identity concern for validation of comments. However, one of the primary methods used to
thwart another’s use of an individual’s identity is by having the individual also provide
evidence of bills from utilities or credit cards sent to the correct address and addressed to the 
correct person. Id. at 25. While this method does lead to increased confidence in the identity
assertion, it would not facilitate comment by individuals without the foresight to continually
save utility bills with the correct name and address that may only arrive once a month, an even
more difficult task if bills are split among different members of the household.
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likewise enable expanded access here, there is still an important 
distinction.
Identification here is not required as a gateway before submission of 
a comment is possible, it is merely used to add credibility to a comment
that could be submitted without verification as well. A lack of
identification therefore does not prevent any voices from being heard. It 
results in a slight reduction in value rather than a prohibition.
The issue at stake, submitting comments to a rulemaking, while an
important component of our democratic system, as discussed in Part I, is
nevertheless not as significant a fundamental right as voting, another
instance where identification has been a concern.123 Not being able to
place a verified mark next to a comment does not compare to being
completely prevented from voting.
Identification could also be a concern for individuals who may not
wish to reveal their personal information due to stalking or other
concerns. Anonymous comments could continue to be submitted, when
allowed by the agency, and an individual could make a choice to submit
unverified (altered) details rather than comment under a verified identity 
if they felt it necessary. 
Adding a verification option for comment submission, rather than a
verification requirement, helps mitigate any potential negative effects for 
those for whom the current system offers some important advantage.
Verifying comments would help the agencies by reducing the total
number of comments and particularly reducing the number of fake
comments. It would protect members of the public from having their
identity used without their permission in comments. Finally, for third
parties, it would not only allow them to retain the current beneficial
structure, as with mass comments, but would potentially enable them to
improve the accuracy of the data they are currently collecting, thereby
making it particularly useful for them, and making the transition easier.
Fake comments harm agencies by wasting agency time and
resources, providing inaccurate information, and damaging the public’s
123. See generally Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631 (2007)
(explaining the then state of the laws and criticizing photo-ID requirements).
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opinion of the entire rulemaking process. Reducing the comparative value
of fake comments, by helping distinguish the verified comments, would 
be expected to reduce the number of fake comments. This in turn would
reduce the amount of agency resources that go into addressing these
comments, particularly to the extent it would reduce the number of deep
fakes, the fake comments constructed to each be unique enough to avoid
being treated as a single mass comment.124 
Unlike traditional mass comments, which can often be bundled and
processed as a single comment, a deep fake will generally need to be read 
through on its own, to check and make sure that there is nothing
substantive the agency could miss. Reducing the value of these comments 
would reduce the number, saving agency resources.
Reducing the number of fake comments would also help improve
the public’s perception of the rulemaking process, since better control of
fake comments would help reduce the public concern that those fake 
comments were manipulating the final agency decision.125 
The members of the public most significantly affected by fake
comments are those whose identities were used without their permission
on comments submitted to the agency. Reducing the comparative value
of fake comments, and thus the number of fake comments in general,
would help prevent additional members of the public from falling victim
to this.
Verifying comments would also directly help those who do find their
identities were compromised. There have been calls to force agencies to
remove comments identified as fake, and there is no justifiable reason
why an agency should refuse to remove one of many identical comments
if it has been identified as fake,126 but a court could take issue with the
removal of a comment that was not already substantively duplicated in
the record elsewhere, and those are the most likely comments to be
124. See supra note 54 (providing early examples of “deep fakes”).
125. As discussed in Section II.A, the substance of the vast majority of fake comments
would be expected to have no effect on the final rule. However, the public perception, that
the total number of comments received on an issue should impact the final decision of the 
agency, does not agree with this and has proven very difficult to change.
126. Cf. Transcript, supra note 20, at 22–23 (raising the possibility of simply removing 
the identifying information from a comment identified as fake while retaining the substance
of the comment).
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damaging to someone’s reputation.127 Removing the name from a
comment that was reported as fake while leaving the substance of the
comment would seem to help solve this issue. Indeed, there is no reason
an agency should not be willing to do this.
But removal in that situation requires that the individual notify the
agency that a fake comment has been found in time to remove it, and
many people are unaware that their identities were used in a submitted
comment (people do not routinely check the dockets of rules they
otherwise have little interest in on the off chance someone has stolen their
personal information and used it to submit a comment).
Having something to signify that a comment is not known for sure
to have been submitted by the person claimed would help to protect the
public from fake comments that remain up either because they might still
provide information or because the agency was not notified to take them
down.
Some third parties have used fake commentors in the past.128 For an
organization dependent on fictitious commentors, reducing the value and
hopefully eliminating the use of fake comments would not be considered 
a benefit.
For all the other third-party groups, however, allowing comments to 
be validated would make their legitimate comments more valuable, since
they would each clearly stand for an individual backing the statement of
the organization. Getting validated information from commentors would
also be a particular value to the organization.
Since this desire for data on commentors is likely behind the rise in 
mass comments, this makes this proposal even more appealing for these
groups. The mass comment proposal (discussed in Section III.A) is
designed to allow these organizations to retain the benefits they currently 
enjoy through the mass comment process; that is, it is essentially value
neutral for them. Verifying comments, however, has the potential to 
actually make the process more valuable for these groups, and would lead
to even greater buy-in.
127. See supra Section II.B.2.
128. These fake commentors could be obtained directly or indirectly. See Singer-Vine & 
Collier, supra, note 30 (“[Shane] Cory was working for Ralph Reed . . . who himself was
working for Broadband for America. Cory, in turn, enlisted LCX Digital to find the
commenters.”).
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CONCLUSION 
One man one vote is a sacred construct in much of American law, 
but not in the notice and comment process. This does not mean the
process should encourage multiple repetitive comments from a single
person or paid by an organization. This is neither necessary nor desirable
in the age of the internet. Instead, the shift should be in the other direction,
allowing and encouraging individuals to sign on to a comment submitted
by someone else. Turning mass comment campaigns into campaigns for
additional signatures would also make clear to those signing that there is
no benefit to signing more than once, countering the vote early and vote
often commentors who currently submit dozens or even hundreds of the
same comments.
Similarly, allowing commentors to choose to verify their identity
when submitting a comment would reduce the value of fake comments
and help eliminate them from the process. It would also safeguard agency
resources, protect those currently the victims of fake comment
campaigns, and could even provide interest groups with better
information than they are currently receiving, which would be expected 
to lead to greater buy-in from the entities driving the mass comment 
phenomenon.
